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Abstract. A large set of moduli, for which the speed of bipartite modular mul-
tiplication considerably increases, is proposed in this work. By considering state
of the art attacks on public-key cryptosystems, we show that the proposed set is
safe to use in practice for both elliptic curve cryptography and RSA cryptosys-
tems. We propose a hardware architecture for the modular multiplier that is based
on our method. The results show that, concerning the speed, our proposed archi-
tecture outperforms the modular multiplier based on standard bipartite modular
multiplication. Additionally, our design consumes less area compared to the stan-
dard solutions.
Keywords: Bipartite modular multiplication (BMM), Barrett reduction, Mont-
gomery reduction, Public-key cryptography (PKC).
1 Introduction
Public-key cryptography (PKC), a concept introduced by Diffie and Hellman [9] in
the mid 70’s, has gained its popularity together with the rapid evolution of today’s
digital communication systems. The best-known public-key cryptosystems are based
on factoring i.e. RSA [20] and on the discrete logarithm problem in a large prime field
(Diffie-Hellman, ElGamal, Schnorr, DSA) [14] or on an elliptic curve (ECC/HECC) [2].
Based on the hardness of the underlaying mathematical problem, PKC usually deals
with large numbers ranging from a few hundreds to a few thousands of bits in size.
Consequently, the efficient implementations of the PKC primitives has always been a
challenge.
An efficient implementation of the mentioned cryptosystems highly depends on the
efficient implementation of modular arithmetic. Namely, modular multiplication forms
the basis of modular exponentiation which is the core operation of the RSA cryptosys-
tem. It is also present in many other cryptographic algorithms including those based
on ECC and HECC. In particular, if one uses projective coordinates for ECC/HECC,
modular multiplication remains the most time consuming operation for ECC. Hence, an
efficient implementation of PKC relies on efficient modular multiplication.
Two algorithms for modular multiplication, namely Barrett [3] and Montgomery [15]
algorithms are widely used today. Both algorithms avoid multiple-precision divisions,
the operation that is considered to be expensive, especially in hardware. The classical
modular multiplication algorithm, based on Barrett’s reduction, uses single-precision
M.A. Hasan and T. Helleseth (Eds.): WAIFI 2010, LNCS 6087, pp. 166–179, 2010.
c© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010
Speeding Up Bipartite Modular Multiplication 167
multiplications with a precomputed modulus reciprocal instead of expensive divisions
[8]. An algorithm that efficiently combines classical and Montgomery multiplications,
both in finite fields of characteristic 2, was first proposed by Potgieter [17] in 2002. Pub-
lished in 2005, a bipartite modular multiplication (BMM) by Kaihara and Takagi [11]
extended this approach to the ring of integers.
In this work, we propose a large set of moduli, for which the intermediate quotient
evaluation in both Barrett and Montgomery algorithms basically comes for free. There-
fore a speed of bipartite modular multiplication, where the Barrett and Montgomery
algorithms are the main ingredients, significantly increases. By considering state of the
art attacks on public-key cryptosystems, we show that the proposed set is safe to use
in practice for both ECC/HECC and RSA cryptosystems. We propose a hardware ar-
chitecture for the modular multiplier that outperforms the multiplier based on standard
BMM method.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces preliminar-
ies. Section 3 describes the proposed method. In Sect. 4 we give the results of hardware
implementations and Sect. 5 discusses the security issues. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
In the paper we use the following notations. A multiple-precision n-bit integer A is
represented in radix r representation as A = (Anw−1 . . . A0)r where r = 2w; nw
represents the number of digits and is equal to
⌈
n/w
⌉
where w is a digit-size; Ai is
called a digit and Ai ∈ [0, r − 1].
2.1 Classical and Montgomery Modular Multiplication Methods
Given a modulus M and two elements X,Y ∈ ZM where ZM is the ring of integers
modulo M , the ordinary modular multiplication is defined as:
X × Y  XY mod M .
Let the modulus M be an nw-digit integer, where the radix of each digit is r = 2w.
The classical modular multiplication algorithm computes XY mod M by interleaving
the multiplication and modular reduction phases as it is shown in Algorithm 1. The cal-
culation of the intermediate quotient qC at step 4 of the algorithm is done by utilizing
integer division which is considered as an expensive operation, especially in hardware.
The idea of using the precomputed reciprocal of the modulus M and simple shift and
multiplication operations instead of division originally comes from Barrett [3]. To ex-
plain the basic idea, we rewrite the intermediate quotient qC as:
qC =
⌊ Z
M
⌋
=
⌊ Z
2n+β
2n+α
M
2α−β
⌋
≥
⌊⌊ Z
2n+β
⌋⌊
2n+α
M
⌋
2α−β
⌋
= qˆ .
The value qˆ represents an estimation of the intermediate quotient qC . In most of the
cryptographic applications, the modulus M is fixed during the many modular multipli-
cations and hence the value 2n+α/M can be precomputed and reused multiple times.
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Algorithm 1. Classical modular multiplication algorithm.
Input: X = (Xnw−1 . . .X0)r , Y = (Ynw−1 . . . Y0)r , M = (Mnw−1 . . .M0)r where 0 ≤
X,Y < M , 2n−1 ≤ M < 2n, r = 2w and nw =
⌈
n/w
⌉
.
Output: Z = XY mod M .
1: Z ⇐ 0
2: for i = nw − 1 downto 0 do
3: Z ⇐ Zr + XYi
4: qC ⇐ Z/M
5: Z ⇐ Z − qCM
6: end for
7: Return Z.
Furthermore, an integer division with the power of 2 is a simple shift operation in hard-
ware. Since the value of qˆ is an estimated value, some correction steps at the end of the
modular multiplication algorithm have to be performed. In his thesis, Dhem [8] deter-
mines the values of α and β for which the classical modular multiplication, based on
Barrett reduction algorithm, needs at most one subtraction at the end of the algorithm.
The improved Barrett algorithm [8], uses the following parameters: α = w + 3 and
β = −2.
Montgomery’s algorithm [15] is the most commonly utilized modular multiplication
algorithm today. In contrast to classical modular multiplication, it utilizes right to left
divisions. Given an nw-digit odd modulus M and an integer U ∈ ZM , the image or the
Montgomery residue of U is defined as X = UR mod M where R, the Montgomery
radix, is a constant relatively prime to M . If X and Y are, respectively, the images of
U and V , the Montgomery multiplication of these two images is defined as:
X ∗ Y  XY R−1 mod M .
The result is the image of UV mod M and needs to be converted back at the end of
the process. For the sake of efficient implementation, one usually uses R = rnw where
r = 2w is the radix of each digit. Similar to the Barrett multiplication, this algorithm
uses a precomputed value M ′ = −M−1 mod r = −M−10 mod r. The algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 2.
2.2 Bipartite Modular Multiplication Method
An algorithm that efficiently combines classical and Montgomery multiplications, both
in finite fields of characteristic 2, was first proposed by Potgieter [17] in 2002. Extend-
ing this approach to the ring of integers, the bipartite modular multiplication (BMM)
was introduced by Kaihara and Takagi in [11]. The method efficiently combines a clas-
sical modular multiplication method with Montgomery’s modular multiplication algo-
rithm. It splits the operand multiplier into two parts that can be processed separately
in parallel, increasing the calculation speed. The calculation is performed using Mont-
gomery residues defined by a modulus M and a Montgomery radix R, R < M . Next,
we outline the main idea of the BMM method.
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Algorithm 2. Montgomery modular multiplication algorithm.
Input: X = (Xnw−1 . . .X0)r, Y = (Ynw−1 . . . Y0)r, M = (Mnw−1 . . .M0)r, M ′ =
−M−10 mod r where 0 ≤ X,Y < M , 2n−1 ≤ M < 2n, r = 2w, gcd(M, r)=1 and
nw =
⌈
n/w
⌉
.
Output: Z = XY r−nw mod M .
1: Z ⇐ 0
2: for i = 0 to nw − 1 do
3: Z ⇐ Z + XYi
4: qM ⇐ (Z mod r)M ′ mod r
5: Z ⇐ (Z + qMM)/r
6: end for
7: if Z ≥ M then
8: Z ⇐ Z −M
9: end if
10: Return Z.
Let the modulus M be an nw-digit integer, where the radix of each digit is r = 2w
and let R = rk where 0 < k < nw. Consider the multiplier Y to be split into two parts
YH and YL so that Y = YHR + YL. Then, the Montgomery multiplication modulo M
of the integers X and Y can be computed as follows:
X ∗ Y = XY R−1 mod M
= X(YHR + YL)R−1 mod M
=
(
(XYH mod M) + (XYLR−1 mod M)
)
mod M .
The left term of the last equation, XYH mod M , can be calculated using the clas-
sical modular multiplication that processes the upper part of the split multiplier YH .
The right term, XYLR−1 mod M , can be calculated using the Montgomery algorithm
that processes the lower part of the split multiplier YL. Both calculations can be per-
formed in parallel. Since the split operands YH and YL are shorter in length than
Y , the calculations XYH mod M and XYLR−1 mod M are performed faster than
XY R−1 mod M .
2.3 Related Work
Before introducing related work we note here that for the moduli used in all common
ECC cryptosystems, the modular reduction can be done much faster than the one pro-
posed by Barrett or Montgomery. Even without any multiplication. This is the reason
behind standardizing generalized Mersenne prime moduli (sums/differences of a few
powers of 2) [16,1,21].
The idea of speeding up a modular multiplication by simplifying an intermediate
quotient was first presented by Quisquater [18] at the rump session of Eurocrypt ’90.
The method is similar to the one of Barrett except that the modulus is preprocessed
before the modular multiplication in such a way that the evaluation of the intermediate
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quotient basically comes for free. Preprocessing requires some extra memory and com-
putational time, but the latter is negligible when many modular multiplications are per-
formed using the same modulus.
In [12], Lenstra proposes several ways to generate RSA moduli with any number
of predetermined leading (trailing) bits, with the fraction of specified bits only limited
by security considerations. He points out that choosing such moduli is beneficial both
for storage and computational requirements. Furthermore, Lenstra discusses security
issues and concludes that the resulting moduli do not seem to offer less security than
regular RSA moduli. Joye [10] enhances the method for generating RSA moduli with a
predetermined portion proposed in [12].
3 Speeding Up the Bipartite Modular Multiplication
In both Barrett and Montgomery modular multiplication algorithms, the precomputed
values of either modulus reciprocal or modulus inverse are used in order to avoid
multiple-precision divisions. However, single-precision multiplications still need to be
performed (step 4 of the algorithms above). This especially concerns the hardware im-
plementations, as the multiplication with the precomputed values often occurs within
the critical path of the whole design. Section 4 discusses this issue in more detail.
Since the BMM method utilizes both Barrett and Montgomery multiplication algo-
rithms, one needs to precompute both μ =
⌊
2n+α/M
⌋
and M ′ = −M−10 mod r. Let
us, for now, assume that the precomputed values are both of type 2γ where γ ∈ Z. By
tuning μ and M ′ to be of this special type, we transform a single-precision multiplica-
tion with these values into a simple shift operation in hardware. Therefore, we find a set
of moduli for which the precomputed values are both of type 2γ . A lemma that defines
this set is given below:
Lemma 1. Let M = 2n − Δ2w − 1 be an n-bit positive integer in radix r = 2w
representation with Δ ∈ Z, w ∈ N and w < n. Now, let μ = ⌊2n+α/M⌋ where α ∈ N
and M ′ = −M−10 mod r. The following statement holds:
μ = 2α ∧ M ′ = 1 ⇒ 0 ≤ Δ ≤
⌊
2n − 2α − 1
2w(2α + 1)
⌋
.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we first rewrite 2n+α as:
2n+α = M2α + Δ2w+α + 2α .
Now, the reciprocal μ of the modulus M can be written as:
μ =
⌊2n+α
M
⌋
= 2α +
⌊Δ2w+α + 2α
M
⌋
= 2α +
⌊ λ
M
⌋
Having that μ = 2α, the inequality 0 ≤ λ < M must hold. By solving the left part of
inequality (λ ≥ 0) we get:
Δ ≥ −2−w . (1)
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Similar, for the right part of inequality (λ < M ) we get:
Δ <
2n − 2α − 1
2w
(
2α + 1
) . (2)
From the condition M ′ = −M−10 mod r = 1 it follows that M ≡ −1 mod r. This
is true for all Δ ∈ Z. Finally, a condition that the modulus M is an n-bit integer
(2n−1 ≤ M < 2n) makes the last condition for Δ:
−2−w < Δ ≤ 2n−w−1 − 2−w . (3)
Now, from the inequalities (1), (2), (3) and the fact that Δ ∈ Z, follows the final condi-
tion for Δ:
0 ≤ Δ ≤
⌊
2n − 2α − 1
2w(2α + 1)
⌋
.
The previous theorem defines a set of moduli for which both conditions μ = 2α and
M ′ = 1 are true. As mentioned earlier, to minimize the number of correction steps in
the improved Barrett algorithm [8], we choose α = w + 3. Finally, the proposed set is
defined as:
S : M = 2n −Δ2w − 1 where 0 ≤ Δ ≤
⌊
2n − 2w+3 − 1
2w(2w+3 + 1)
⌋
.
Figure 1 further illustrates the properties of the proposed set. As can be seen, the w least
significant bits and the w + 3 most significant bits are fixed to be all 1’s while the other
n− 2w − 3 bits can be randomly chosen.
…all 1’s… … 11
n-1 0
S: 
…all 1’s…mw
w+3 wn-2w-3
mn-w-4
Fig. 1. Binary representation of the proposed set
The evaluation of the intermediate quotient for the improved Barrett algorithm, qˆ, now
becomes equal to:
qˆ =
⌊⌊ Z
2n+β
⌋
μ
2α−β
⌋
=
⌊⌊ Z
2n+β
⌋
2α
2α−β
⌋
=
⌊⌊ Z
2n+β
⌋
2β
⌋
.
For β ≤ 0, the previous equation becomes simplified and equivalent to:
qˆ =
⌊
Z
2n
⌋
.
Since M ′ = 1, the intermediate quotient for the Montgomery multiplication also gets
simplified:
qM = Z mod r .
Finally, the bipartite modular multiplication for the proposed set of moduli is given in
Algorithm 3. After the final addition is performed, one more correction step might be
necessary since 0 ≤ ZH + ZL < 2M .
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Algorithm 3. BMM algorithm for the proposed set of moduli.
Input: X = (Xnw−1 . . .X0)r , Y = (Ynw−1 . . . Y0)r = YHrk + YL, M =
(Mnw−1 . . .M0)r ∈ S, where 0 ≤ X,Y < M , r = 2w, 0 < k < nw and nw =
⌈
n/w
⌉
.
Output: Z = XY r−k mod M .
1: ZH ⇐ 0
2: for i = nw − 1 downto k do
3: ZH ⇐ ZHr + XYi
4: qˆ ⇐ ⌊ZH/2n
⌋
5: ZH ⇐ ZH − qˆM
6: end for
7: if ZH ≥ M then
8: ZH ⇐ ZH −M
9: end if
1: ZL ⇐ 0
2: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
3: ZL ⇐ ZL + XYi
4: qM ⇐ ZL mod r
5: ZL ⇐ (ZL + qMM)/r
6: end for
7: if ZL ≥ M then
8: ZL ⇐ ZL −M
9: end if
Return Z ⇐ ZH + ZL
4 Hardware Implementation
To verify our approach in practice, we implement a set of multipliers that are based
on our proposal and compare them with the multipliers that support the original BMM
algorithm. Obviously, the mission of the BMM algorithm is to utilize the parallel com-
putation and hence, increase the speed of the modular multiplication. Therefore, in order
to compare different designs with the same input size, we define a relative throughput
as
Tr =
1
Ntcp
where tcp is a critical path delay and N is a number of clock cycles. The total throughput
is then obtained as T = BTr, where B is the number of bits processed in 1/Tr time.
To maximize the throughput, one obviously needs to decrease both N and tcp. Typi-
cally, there are plenty of trade-offs to explore in order to make an optimal (in this case
fastest) design. To make an objective comparison, we distinguish between designs that
aim at the shortest critical path and the ones that achieve the minimum number of clock
cycles. We address each of them separately, in the coming subsections.
4.1 Optimization Goal: Shortest Critical Path
A modular multiplier based on the BMM algorithm, depicted in Fig. 2, consists of four
multiple-precision multipliers (πH1, πH2, πL1, πL2). Apart from the multipliers, the ar-
chitecture contains some additional adders (ΣL, ΣH and Σ). The multiple-precision
multipliers are implemented in a digit-serial manner which typically provides a good
trade-off between area and speed. The multipliers πH1 and πH2 assemble together the
Barrett modular multiplier that processes the most significant half of Y (that is YH ).
Similarly, the multipliers πL1 and πL2 form the Montgomery modular multiplier that
processes the least significant half of Y (that is YL). The results of both multipliers are
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finally added together, resulting in Z = XY r−k mod M . The parameters k and α are
chosen such that the execution speed is maximized and the number of correction steps
is minimized: k =
⌊
nw/2
⌋
and α = w + 3.
A choice of the specific architecture is based on the following criteria. The two levels
of parallelism are exploited such that the number of clock cycles needed for one mod-
ular multiplication is minimized. First, the BMM algorithm itself is constructed such
that the Barrett part and the Montgomery part of the multiplier work independently, in
parallel. Second, the multiple-precision multipliers πH1 and πH2 in the Barrett part,
and πL1 and πL2 in the Montgomery part operate with the independent data such that
they run in parallel and speed-up the whole multiplication process. The critical path is
minimized and consists of one multiplexer, a single-precision multiplier and an adder
(bold line, Fig. 2).
n-bit n-bitn-bit
*
n+3w-bit
+
*
n+w-bit
+
+
X YM M’
ww ww
w
n+w2w 2wn+w
n+w+1 n+w
n+wn+w
n+w+1 -bit
πL2 πL1
*
n+w-bit
+
n+3α-bit
+
µ
αα ww
α
n+α2α 2wn+w
n+α+1n+α
n+wn+α
n+α+1 -bit
πH1 πH2
YH YL
+
nn
n-bit Z
ZLZH
α-bit w-bit
ΣH ΣL
Σ
*
+
Fig. 2. Datapath of the modular multiplier with the shortest critical path based on BMM method
In order to avoid any ambiguity we provide a graph in Fig. 3 which shows the exact
timing schedule of separate blocks inside the multiplier. With i (0 ≤ i < k) we denote
the current iteration of the algorithm. Each iteration consists of nw + 3 clock cycles
except the first iteration that lasts for nw + 1 cycles.
4.2 Optimization Goal: Minimum Number of Clock Cycles
In order to minimize the number of clock cycles needed for one modular multiplication,
the architecture from Fig. 2 is modified as depicted in Fig. 4. Two single-precision
multipliers (πH3 and πL3), consisting only of a pure combinatorial logic, are added
without requiring any clock cycles for calculating their products.
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πH1
● ● ● ● ● ●
…
● ● ● ● ● ●
πH2
● ● ● ● ● ●
πL1
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
πL2
● ● ● ● ● ●
ΣH
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
ΣL
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
Σ ●
i 0 1 2 3 … k-3 k-2 k-1
Fig. 3. Timing schedule of the BMM multiplier with the shortest critical path
n-bit n-bitn-bit w-bit
*
*
n+w-bit
+
*
n+w-bit
+
+
ww ww
ww
n+w2w 2wn+w
n+w+1 n+w
n+wn+w
n+w+1 -bit
2w
πL3
α-bit
*
n+w-bit
+
n+α-bit
+
µ
αα ww
αα
n+α2α 2wn+w
n+α+1n+α
n+wn+α
n+α+1 -bit
2α
πH3
YH YL
+
nn
n-bit
X YM M’
πL2 πL1πH1 πH2
Z
ZLZH
ΣH ΣL
Σ
+
*
*
Fig. 4. Datapath of the modular multiplier with the minimized number of clock cycles based on
BMM method
We again provide a graph in Fig. 5 which shows the timing schedule of the multiplier.
Each iteration now consists of nw +2 clock cycles except the first that lasts for nw +1
cycles.
The critical path of the whole design occurs from the output of the register ZH to the
input of the temporary register in πH1, passing through two single-precision multipliers
and one adder (bold line).
4.3 Proposed Multiplier
An architecture of the modular multiplier based on the BMM method with the moduli
from the proposed set (see Algorithm 3) is shown in Fig. 6. The most important dif-
ference is that there are no multiplications with the precomputed values and hence, the
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πH1
● ● ●
…
● ● ●
πH2
● ● ● ● ● ●
πH3
● ● ● ● ● ●
πL1
● ● ● ● ● ●
πL2
● ● ● ● ● ●
πL3
● ● ● ● ● ●
ΣH
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
ΣL
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
Σ ●
i 0 1 2 3 … k-3 k-2 k-1
Fig. 5. Timing schedule of the BMM multiplier with the minimized number of clock cycles
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αα ww
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YH YL
+
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n-bit Z
ZLZH
ΣH ΣL
Σ
*
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Fig. 6. Datapath of the modular multiplier based on BMM method with the modulus from the
proposed set
critical path contains one single-precision multiplier and one adder only. A full timing
schedule of the multiplier is given in Fig. 7. The number of cycles remains the same as
in the architecture from Fig. 4 while the critical path reduces.
4.4 Results
To show this in practice, we have synthesized 192-bit, 512-bit and 1024-bit multipliers,
each with the digit size of 16, 32 and 64 bits. The designs were synthesized using UMC
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πH1
● ● ●
…
● ● ●
πH2
● ● ● ● ● ●
πL1
● ● ● ● ● ●
πL2
● ● ● ● ● ●
ΣH
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
ΣL
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
Σ ●
i 0 1 2 3 … k-3 k-2 k-1
Fig. 7. Timing schedule of the proposed BMM multiplier
0.13 μm CMOS High-Speed standard cell library with Synopsys Design Vision version
C-2009.06-SP3. The results are given in Table 1.
Observing the implementation results, we conclude that our proposed design out-
performs the standard BMM design with the shortest critical path for at most 18 %. A
design that is based on standard BMM with the minimum number of clock cycles is
outperformed by at most 67 %. Furthermore, our design consumes less area than all its
counterparts.
5 On the Security of the Proposed Set
In this section we analyze the security implications of choosing primes in the proposed
set for use in ECC/HECC and in RSA.
In the current state of the art, the security of ECC/HECC over finite fields GF(pm)
only depends on the extension degree m of the field [2]. Therefore, the security does
not depend on the precise structure of the prime p. This is illustrated by the particular
choices for p that have been made in several standards such as SEC [21], NIST [16],
ANSI [1]. In particular, the following primes have been proposed: p192 = 2192−264−1,
p224 = 2224 − 296 + 1, p256 = 2256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 1, p384 = 2384 − 2128 −
296+232−1, and p521 = 2521−1. It is easy to verify that for w ≤ 28 all primes except
p224 are in S. In conclusion: choosing a prime of prescribed structure has no influence
on the security of ECC/HECC.
The case of RSA requires a more detailed analysis than ECC/HECC. First, we as-
sume that the modulus N is chosen from the proposed set. This is a special case of the
security analysis given in [12] followed by the conclusion that the resulting moduli do
not seem to offer less security than regular RSA moduli.
Next, we assume that the primes p and q that constitute the modulus N = pq are
both chosen in the set S. To analyze the security implications of the restricted choice
of p and q, we first make a trivial observation. The number of n-bit primes in the set
S for n > 259 + 2w is large enough such that the exhaustive listing of these sets is
impossible, since a maximum of 2w + 3 bits are fixed.
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Table 1. Synthesis results for the hardware architectures of 192-bit, 512-bit and 1024-bit modular
multipliers
Design n w Area tcp N Tr
[bit] [bit] [kGE] [ns] [MHz]
16 48.20 2.94 178 1.91
192 32 85.66 4.46 52 4.31
64 212.40 7.29 16 8.57
16 96.31 3.17 1118 0.28
Fig. 2 512 32 134.10 4.79 302 0.69
64 259.84 7.49 86 1.55
16 177.93 3.33 4286 0.07
1024 32 208.59 5.19 1118 0.17
64 356.37 7.46 302 0.44
16 50.17 4.34 167 1.38
192 32 84.25 6.81 47 3.12
64 220.73 12.16 14 5.87
16 97.44 4.28 1087 0.21
Fig. 4 512 32 127.33 6.95 287 0.50
64 271.54 12.43 79 1.02
16 169.49 4.48 4223 0.05
1024 32 198.01 6.91 1087 0.13
64 341.59 12.22 287 0.29
16 44.65 2.92 167 2.05
192 32 83.14 4.18 47 5.09
64 204.73 7.25 14 9.85
16 95.23 3.10 1087 0.30
Fig. 6 512 32 137.41 4.37 287 0.80
64 247.35 7.45 79 1.70
16 183.01 3.16 4223 0.07
1024 32 211.07 4.71 1087 0.20
64 346.40 7.45 287 0.47
The security analysis then corresponds to attacks on RSA with partially known fac-
torization. This problem has been analyzed extensively in the literature and the first
results come from Rivest and Shamir [19] in 1985. They describe an algorithm that
factors N in polynomial time if 2/3 of the bits of p or q are known. In 1995, Copper-
smith [5] improves this bound to 3/5.
Today’s best attacks all rely on variants of Coppersmith’s method published in 1996
[7,6]. A good overview of these algorithms is given in [13]. The best results in this
area are as follows. Let N be an n bit number, which is a product of two n/2-bit
primes. If half of the bits of either p or q (or both) are known, then N can be factored in
polynomial time. If less than half of the bits are known, say n/4− ε bits, then the best
algorithm simply guesses ε bits and then applies the polynomial time algorithm, leading
to a running time exponential in ε. In practice, the values of w (typically w ≤ 64) and
n (n ≥ 1024) are always chosen such that our proposed moduli remain secure against
Coppersmith’s factorization algorithm, since at most 2w + 3 bits of p and q are known.
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Finally, we consider a similar approach extended to moduli of the form N = prq
where p and q have the same bit-size. This extension was proposed by Boneh, Durfee
and Howgrave-Graham [4]. Assuming that p and q are of the same bit-size, one needs
a 1/(r + 1)-fraction of the most significant bits of p in order to factor N in polynomial
time. In other words, for the case r = 1, we need half of the bits, whereas for e.g. r = 2
we need only a third of the most significant bits of p. These results show that the primes
p, q ∈ S, assembling an RSA modulus of the form N = prq, should be used with care.
This is especially true when r is large. Note that if r ≈ log p, the latter factoring method
factors N in polynomial time for any general primes p, q ∈ N.
6 Conclusion
A set of moduli for which the performance of bipartite modular multiplication con-
siderably increases is proposed in this work. The size of the set is determined by the
digit-size and the length of the modulus. Since the security level of ECC/HECC does
not depend at all on the precise structure of the prime p, our proposed set is safe to be
used for constructing underlying fields in elliptic curves cryptography. The case of RSA
is also discussed with a conclusion that if used with care (w ≤ 64 and n ≥ 1024) our
proposed set does not decrease the security of RSA.
Additionally, we propose an architecture for a modular multiplier that is based on
our method. The results show that, concerning the speed, our proposed architecture
outperforms the modular multiplier based on standard BMM method with no additional
area overhead.
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